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Nobel Prize-winning economist Paul 
Krugman once wrote: “If there were an 
Economists’ Creed, it would surely contain 
the affirmations ‘I understand the Principle 
of Comparative Advantage’ and ‘I advocate 
Free Trade.’”1 
Economists endorse free trade because 
it creates healthier, more prosperous and 
more dynamic economies. Protectionism 
can sometimes provide fleeting benefits 
to specific domestic industries, but in the 
medium and long run it causes economic 
stagnation and inefficiency.
Unfortunately, political expedience 
often leads countries to ignore well-es-
tablished wisdom and enact protectionist 
policies to preserve jobs during economic 
slowdowns. Even relatively minor flirtations 
with protectionism can snowball, leading to 
trade skirmishes and perhaps all-out trade 
wars and negative feedback cycles between 
recession and protectionism.  
Rising Protectionist Threat
Creates Risks for Texas 
By Edward C. Skelton and Mike Nicholson
Today’s financial turbulence has already 
brought restrictions on the flow of invest-
ment and capital.2 Making matters worse, 
the surge in financial protectionism seems to 
be spreading to trade in goods and services. 
Yielding to protectionist pressures would 
increase prices and hurt industries that rely 
on foreign trade, worsening the recession 
in the short and medium run while hurting 
U.S. competitiveness in the long run.
Texas’ long border with Mexico, busy 
ports and industrial mix—as well as passage 
of the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA) in 1994—have fostered a 
sizable flow of goods and services to and 
from foreign countries. Expanding trade 
has brought jobs and business to Texas but 
has left the state particularly vulnerable to 
antitrade actions. Texas would suffer greatly 
if the U.S. and other countries implement 
protectionist measures.
The Import of Exports 
Texas benefits from trade. Data on the 
value of goods shipped overseas show that 
Texas has been the nation’s largest exporting 
state since 2002, beating even such East and 
West Coast giants as California, New York 
and Florida (Chart 1).3 Texas accounts for 
about 15 percent of all U.S. exports.4
In 2008, exports made up 16.8 percent 
of state output, ranking Texas third among 
states, behind only Louisiana and Wash-
ington. Looking at states similar in size, 
exports’ share of state GDP was 7.6 percent 
in California, 7.3 percent in Florida and 6.7 
percent in New York, placing the three in 
the bottom half of all states. 
The Commerce Department’s most 
recent data show that 6.7 percent of Texas’ 
private-sector jobs were tied directly to 
goods exported in 2006, placing Texas 10th 
among states. Furthermore, the depart-
ment reports that 22.9 percent of the state’s 
manufacturing jobs were linked to exports. 
Chemicals, computers and electronics, ma-
chinery and petroleum-related products 
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ranked as the top exporting industries in 
2008 (Table 1). 
Europe and Asia are growing markets 
for Texas exports, but the state’s ties to Latin 
America run particularly deep. In 2008, the 
region provided a market for 46 percent of 
Texas’ exports, representing 7.7 percent of the 
state’s GDP. In contrast, U.S. exports to Latin 
America made up only 2 percent of GDP. 
The growth of Texas’ exports to Latin 
America has been aided by market-opening 
pacts such as NAFTA. About 70 percent of 
Texas’ Latin America-bound exports go to 
Mexico. However, the state has diversified 
its trade in recent years. Exports to Brazil, 
Chile, Peru and Venezuela have all more 
than doubled in real terms since 2004, 
while sales to Mexico have declined.5
Research shows that free-trade agree-
ments have boosted Texas’ exports, GDP 
and employment. A Dallas Fed study found 
that NAFTA had a robust effect on Texas 
exports to Mexico, accounting for roughly 
a quarter of Texas’ 111 percent increase in 
goods shipped to Mexico between 1993 
and 2000.6 
The study also found that NAFTA fos-
tered statistically significant export gains to 
Mexico across a number of Texas’ largest 
export sectors, including petroleum and 
coal products at 69 percent and electronic 
equipment at 49 percent. 
A similar St. Louis Fed study used 
state-level data from 1988 to 1997 to show 
that NAFTA increased Texas’ real exports 
to Mexico by an annual rate of 14 percent.7 
The study found that NAFTA also had a 
statistically significant, positive impact on 
Texas’ exports to the rest of Latin America. 
Other free trade agreements are also 
fueling Texas’ Latin American exports. 
Texas A&M researchers found that the ag-
ricultural provisions of the Central America 
Free Trade Agreement–Dominican Republic 
resulted in $184.7 million of added busi-
ness activity and 2,415 additional jobs 
for Texas.8 Texas’ exports to Chile have 
increased by 133 percent since the imple-
mentation of the U.S.–Chile Free Trade 
Agreement in 2004.
On net, the data suggest Texas’ econ-
omy benefited from freer trade with Latin 
America. Even so, liberalization isn’t with-
out its downside. 
All else being equal, both economic 
theory and empirical evidence suggest 
Texas workers in import-sensitive industries 
may lose jobs or experience wage cuts as a 
result of greater foreign competition. Work-
ers displaced by trade face significant tran-
sition costs as they develop the job skills 
demanded by firms in other industries. 
During difficult economic times, these costs 
may rise, increasing the cries to protect 
unskilled domestic workers.
Protectionist Rumblings
Despite the theoretical and empirical 
arguments in its favor, trade liberalization 
has been facing headwinds.
U.S. Trade Promotion Authority for 
approving trade agreements, also known 
as fast-track negotiating authority, was al-
lowed to expire in 2007. Under fast track, 
Congress was barred from amending or 
filibustering trade agreements, making ne-
gotiations easier. Since then, Congress has 
exhibited a greater skepticism toward trade 
by failing to ratify free trade agreements 
with South Korea, Colombia and Panama.
After years of stop-and-go talks, World 
Trade Organization negotiations broke 
down again in July 2008. These talks, for-
mally known as the Doha Development 
Round, are aimed at lowering trade barriers 
and increasing global trade. Negotiations 
aren’t expected to resume until later in 
2009.
Protectionism often exacerbates eco-
nomic downturns. Recognizing the danger 
in the current recession, the G-20 leaders 
signed a pledge in November 2008 to avoid 
protectionist measures. However, at least 
17 of the countries reneged. Worldwide, 47 














Computers and electronics 35.4 18.5
Machinery 27.1 14.1
Petroleum and coal products 25.2 13.1
Transportation equipment 16.8 8.8
Primary metals 6.7 3.5
Electrical equipment, appliances 6.5 3.4
Agriculture 6.4 3.3
Fabricated metal products 6.0 3.1
Food 4.4 2.3
SOURCE: WISERTrade; seasonal and other adjustments by the 
Dallas Fed.
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and electronic exports, 38 percent of chemical 
exports and 31 percent of machinery exports 
were bound for Texas’ top 10 Latin American 
trading partners.11 The new trade restrictions 
in Ecuador and Argentina target the machin-
ery industry. 
Historically, the food and apparel sec-
tors have been hotbeds of protectionist sen-
timent. Approximately 57 percent of Texas’ 
apparel exports and 55 percent of its food 
exports are bound for the state’s top Latin 
American trade partners. Argentina and Ec-
uador have placed restrictions on apparel, 
while food figures prominently in Mexico’s 
new package of tariffs. 
Any significant trade restrictions imposed 
on imports from the U.S. could hurt Texas’ 
exports. When faced with increased trade 
barriers, firms often cut workers, hours and 
wages or even move operations overseas. 
We don’t know how many jobs will be 
lost due to any particular protectionist mea-
sure. However, employment data do give 
us some idea of how many jobs might be 
at risk. The three largest exporting sectors 
ranked by dollar value employed 3.2 per-
cent of the state’s private sector workforce 
as of December 2008 and composed 6.7 
percent of its GDP in 2007, the last year for 
which data are available. The food and ap-
parel sectors account for 1 percent of Texas’ 
GDP and a little less than 1 percent of the 
state’s employment.
All told, widespread protectionism 
threatens workers and could be expensive 
mented between October 2008 and Febru-
ary 2009 (Chart 2).
The U.S. included a Buy American 
provision in the recently enacted stimulus 
package, contradicting the G-20 commit-
ment not to implement new protection-
ist measures.9 Although it passed in a 
watered-down version stipulating that trade 
agreements trump the Buy American re-
quirement, this provision provoked a great 
deal of international outrage.
The Buy American brouhaha turned 
out to be more symbolism than substance. 
A more significant trade skirmish broke out 
between Mexico and the U.S. in March 2009, 
touched off by a provision in the 2009 U.S. 
federal budget. The U.S. closed its south-
ern border to Mexican long-haul trucks by 
ending a 2007 pilot program that allowed a 
limited number of Mexican carriers into the 
U.S. and U.S. carriers into Mexico. 
The U.S. action appears to go against 
NAFTA. Under the pact, all Mexican carriers 
were authorized to deliver cargo to border 
states starting in 1995 and anywhere in the 
U.S. starting in 2000. In 1995, however, the 
opening to Mexican trucks was delayed, 
ostensibly due to safety concerns.10 
The argument that Mexican trucks don’t 
adhere to U.S. safety standards appears 
groundless. According to U.S. Department 
of Transportation data on random safety 
inspections, U.S. carriers had a noncompli-
ance rate of 21.7 percent, compared with 
20.7 percent for all Mexican carriers and 7.3 
percent for the carriers in the pilot program.
Immediately following the truck ban, 
Mexico passed retaliatory tariffs of 10 to 45 
percent on 89 U.S. products, whose cross-bor-
ders sales are worth $2.4 billion a year. The 
tariffs targeted states represented by U.S. law-
makers who supported the truck ban while 
sparing imports whose restriction would cre-
ate hardships for the poorest Mexican house-
holds. To put additional pressure on the U.S., 
Mexican trucking companies have filed a suit 
accusing the U.S of violating NAFTA.
Leaders elsewhere in Latin America are 
feeling pressure to shield their economies 
as trade drops, employment falls and popu-
lism gains traction. For example, Ecuador 
has sharply increased overall tariffs on more 
than 600 items, and Argentina has imposed 
new restrictions on many imports.
Trade Vulnerabilities
Latin America looms large for the three 
industries that generate more than half of Tex-
as’ exports. In 2008, 43 percent of computers 
Table 2 
Some Latin American Countries 
Depend Heavily on Exports
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Any significant trade restric-
tions imposed on imports 
from the U.S. could hurt 
Texas’ exports. When faced 
with increased trade barriers, 
firms often cut workers, hours 
and wages or even move 
operations overseas.
Chart 2
Protectionism on the Rise 
in G-20 Countries
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Chart 3
Exports Increase After Free Trade Agreements
A. Mexico: Global Exports and FDI Inflows 
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NOTE: Exports calculated on a balance-of-payments basis.
SOURCE: World Bank Development Indicators.
to the state in terms of forgone business ac-
tivity. The toll would rise if a cycle of pro-
tectionist retaliation spreads the ill effects of 
trade barriers to other Texas industries.12
Latin American countries also have a 
lot to lose from protectionism. Their econo-
mies rely heavily on exports, primarily 
goods and raw materials bound for the U.S.   
In 2008, exports across its northern 
border made up 18 percent of GDP in Mex-
ico, Texas’ biggest trade partner.13 Exports 
are an important share of GDP for other top 
Texas trading partners, notably Venezuela, 
Colombia and Chile (Table 2). 
Free trade agreements have had a 
positive effect on some Latin American 
economies. Mexico’s exports have grown 
substantially since NAFTA’s implementation 
in 1994 (Chart 3A). Despite the country’s at-
tempts to diversify its exports, nearly three-
quarters of overseas sales still went to the 
U.S. in 2008. Chile depends less on the U.S. 
market; even so, its exports surged follow-
ing implementation of the Chile–U.S. free 
trade agreement in 2004 (Chart 3B). Free 
trade agreements with Central America and 
Peru are still too new to gauge their effects. 
For most countries, increasing overseas 
sales go hand-in-hand with rising foreign 
direct investment (FDI), particularly in ex-
porting sectors. FDI is important because 
it encourages economic development and 
accelerates the transfer of technology to de-
veloping countries, making their economies 
more competitive.
For many Latin American countries, 
exports to the U.S. constitute a substantial 
proportion of their overall GDP, and the 
detrimental effects of protectionism could 
be significant. If declining exports make 
countries less competitive, this could trig-
ger decreases in FDI in the longer run. This 
might also damage an important source of 
financial stability in a time when interna-
tional financial turbulence has taken a sig-
nificant toll on regional economies. 
‘Crack Cocaine of Economics’
Economists overwhelmingly support 
trade liberalization because of its most 
powerful implication—that countries can 
capitalize on their comparative advantages, 
lowering consumer prices and boosting 
world GDP in the long run. Despite econo-
mists’ blessing, freer trade nearly always 
faces political pressures favoring beggar-
thy-neighbor policies intended to protect 
some domestic workers and businesses. 
The specter of protectionism tends to loom 
when economies falter and anxieties over 
jobs and incomes build.
In a C-SPAN interview in February 2009, 
Dallas Fed President Richard W. Fisher re-
marked, “Protectionism is the crack cocaine 
of economics. It may provide a high. It’s ad-
dictive, and it leads to economic death.”
Fisher’s words carry a warning for 
Texas, a state that has enjoyed significant 
benefits from foreign trade. This very suc-
cess leaves the state exposed to protec-
tionist experimentation, particularly in the 
Americas. While attempts to curtail imports 
and lock out foreign companies damage the 
U.S. economy and harm U.S. consumers, 
the effects would be particularly detrimental 
to the Texas economy.
Skelton is a business economist in the Financial 
Industry Studies Department and Nicholson is an 
analyst in the Research Department of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Dallas. 
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